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ABSTRACT:  Acquisitions are assumed to create value for both the target and the 
acquiring firm. This paper analyzes the sources of value creation in acquisitions and 
examines the domestic acquisitions that took place in Turkey in 2013. By taking the 
overall market considerations into account, I measure the degree of value creation 
over different periods of time. I use the standard market value technique to calculate 
abnormal returns in stock prices of the acquiring firms and find that the increase in 
firm value is statistically significant in the long run but not in the short run. 
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ÖZET: Şirket satın almalarının hem satın alan hem de satılan firmanın piyasa 
değerini arttırdığı varsayılır. Bu makalede, Türkiye'de 2013 yılında gerçekleşen 
yerli satın almalar, piyasaların genel trendini de göz önünde bulundurarak 
incelenmiştir. Standart Piyasa değeri tekniğini kullanarak, satın alan firmanin hisse 
senedi fiyatlarındaki anormal getiriler hesaplanmıştır . Satın almanin açıklandığı 
tarih öncesi ve sonrasının karşılaştırılması sonucunda, firma değerindeki artışın 
uzun vadede istatistiki olarak anlamlı olduğu, fakat kısa vadede anlamlı olmadığı 
bulunmuştur. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Şirket Satın Almaları; Finansal Piyasalar; Olay Çalışmaları 
 
1.  Introduction 
According to Ernst & Young’s M&A  Report, Turkey is the leading M&A market in 
number and in transaction size in 2012, in the Central and Southern Europe. Turkey 
experienced 297 merger and acquisitions, totaling a transaction volume of 18 billion. 
In such a market with a vast growth potential, it is crucial to understand the 
dynamics behind the value creation in mergers and acquisitions.  
 
Acquisitions are theoretically supposed to create value for both the acquirer and the 
target firm. Even though empirical studies support value creation for the target firm, 
the literature lacks empirical evidence of value creation for the acquirer.2 In this 
paper, I argue that the time frame of the measurement may play an important role in 
determining the value creation. The literature assumes that the synergy, hence value 
creation, shows up right after the acquisition. But, as I demonstrate through the 
paper, it may take up to a few years to observe the full benefit of an acquisition.  
                                                            
1 This research has been done when the author was an assistant professor at Washington and 
Lee University. 
2 Bradley, Desai and Kim (1998) show that the value creation in contested acquisitions is  -
%1.33 for the acquirer. 
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In this paper, I use the market model to estimate the value creation in the acquirer 
firm over different time frames. I consider 2 days, 5 days and 1-year stock market 
data. I find that the increase in firm value is statistically significant in the long run 
but not in the short run. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section examines previous 
research about the effect of acquisitions on the market value of the acquiring firms 
and about the measurement techniques used in the assessment of market value. 
Section 3 briefly explains the sources of firm value creation in acquisitions. Section 
4 elaborates the methodology. Section 5 presents the data and the results. The last 
section concludes and explores further research opportunities. 
 
2. Literature 
The literature on the mergers and acquisitions has developed in two branches. 
Analysis of international mergers focuses on the firm profitability in multi-market 
settings where as the analysis of national  mergers focuses on the comparison with 
international mergers in terms of value creation, competition and the measurement 
of degree of value creation. Horn and Persson (2001) compare international and 
domestic mergers. They find that the main advantage of national mergers for the 
firms is that by decreasing competition, they increase firm profitability. Analyzing 
international costs of transactions, they conclude that domestic mergers are more 
profitable in environments with higher trade costs. In the other branch of the 
literature, In a theoretical setting, Bjorvatn (2003) show that economic integration 
may facilitate international mergers. Since economic integration increases 
competitive pressure in the domestic market, mergers may become more profitable. 
 
The choice of the type of acquisitions critically depends on the assessment of the 
degree of value creation in international and domestic acquisitions. Therefore, it is 
crucial to determine the sources of value creation as well as to have a reliable 
assessment method to compute the values created. In this context; Deepak, Pinches 
and Narayanan (1992) analyze different methods of financing in mergers and 
acquisitions. They prove that stock financing is more beneficial in terms of value 
creation for both the acquirer and the target firm. They also consider the effect of the 
structure of the bidding firm and conclude that conglomerate acquisitions decrease 
the value of the acquiring firm. On the other hand, Seth (1990) looks at the sources 
of the value creation in terms of the relationship between the target and the acquiring 
firm. He finds that related acquisitions do not always have higher success in creating 
value, compared to unrelated acquisitions. In order to explain this surprising result, 
he argues that risk diversification may play an important role in value creation and 
firms, by acquiring unrelated firms, decreases their market risks, therefore may 
increase their market value. In another paper, Chatterjee (1986) classifies the factors 
that may affect the market value of the firms after acquisitions into three groups: 
financial synergy, operational synergy and collusive synergy. He finds that the 
advantages gained through decreased competition after the acquisition (i.e., 
collusive synergy) have the highest effect on the market value. The lowest effect is 
through the cost advantages of the acquisitions (i.e., operational synergy). 
 
Once the possible factors affecting the market value after acquisitions are 
determined, the second crucial step is to find a method to empirically measure the 
change in the market value. MacKinlay (1997) summarizes event study methods and 
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gives an example from stock market where he calculates, at first, the normal 
performance and then abnormal returns and compares them to determine whether the 
event is statistically significant. In this paper, I follow his method to find our 
weather the event "acquisition" has statistically significant effect on the market 
value of the firm. 
 
Besides their microeconomic effects such as the impact on the firm value and 
industry, the welfare effects of both domestic and international acquisitions and their 
policy implications are widely analyzed in the literature too. Horn and Levinsson 
(2001) discuss the role of international agreements on the choice of merger and 
acquisition type.  
 
The literature on merger and acquisition activities in Turkey is limited compared to 
the international literature. Akben-Selcuk and Altiok-Yilmaz (2011) analyze the 
effect of mergers and acquisitions from both an economic and accounting 
perspective. They find that the acquirer firms are negatively affected by M&As. In 
another paper, Hekimoglu and Tanyeri (2011) compare the abnormal returns after 
acquisitions in Turkey with the ones in EU and US. They find that the abnormal 
returns in Turkey are positive but small compared to the returns in EU and US. 
 
3. Sources of Value Creation in Acquisitions 
Value-maximizing hypothesis of acquisitions states that acquisitions occur to 
maximize the combined market value of the firms. Therefore, acquisitions increase 
both the acquiring and the target firm's market value. Value creation is realized as a 
result of a process called "synergy", which provides a new and efficient allocation of 
firms' scarce resources after the acquisition. The synergy may happen at any stage of 
the market activity. These stages can be classified into 5 broad categories: Market 
power, economies of scale, economies of scope, coinsurance, and financial 
diversification.3 By taking Seth (1997)'s classification into account, I group the 
sources of value creation in acquisitions in 5 categories: 
 
3.1. Market Power 
Firms, by undertaking horizontal acquisitions, may decrease the competition in the 
market. Therefore, the price level and the profits increase, which positively affects 
the value of the acquiring firm.4 For instance, Denizbank's acquisition of Citi Turkey 
Retail Banking Division is expected to increase Denizbank's market power, thus its 
market value. Also, after the acquisition, the rivals may mutually decrease 
competition by entry deterrence. Since the acquiring firm is stronger after the 
acquisition, its market power increases, which influences the decision of its rivals. 
 
3.2.  Economies of Scale 
In cases of acquisitions where the firms use similar raw materials, the cost of raw 
materials may decrease, which in turn increases profitability, hence market value. 
The firms may also undertake lower-cost inventory management techniques after the 
acquisition. In order to enjoy the synergy created by economies of scale, the firms 
must be related, either operating in the same market (horizontal merger and 
                                                            
3 Seth, Anju, "Value creation in acquisitions: A reexamination of performance issues.", 
Strategic Management Journal, 11.2, 1990, p102. 
4 This issue is strictly monitored by Turkish Competition Authority. 
82 Fatma Büşra GÜNAY BENDAŞ 
 
acquisitions) or sharing similar factors of production. As an example of the synergy 
created by economies of scale, we can give Urfar Pharmaceuticals' acquisition of 
Bilim Pharmaceuticals. 
 
3.3. Economies of Scope 
If a firm acquires a related firm (not operating in the same market), they may 
experience economies of scope.5 The best example for this type of synergy is created 
in vertical acquisitions where the final product of one firm is the raw material of the 
other. The combined market value of the firms will increase after the acquisition due 
to both increased sales and reduced production costs. Yıldız Holding's acquisition of 
Adapazarı Sugar factory is expected to decrease Yıldız Holding's production cost, 
which may cause an increase in Yıldız Holding's firm value. 
 
3.4. Diversification of Risk 
The firm undertaking the acquisition activity may benefit from decreased risk of 
bankruptcy, if he is not sharing the same risk environment with the target firm. For 
instance, in 2013, Torunlar Food acquired Başkent Natural Gas Distribution. By 
diversifying the risk associated with his main industry of operation, Torunlar Food 
decreased his risk of bankruptcy. After the acquisition, the acquiring firm may enjoy 
higher levels of debt capacity in case of bankruptcy, which further increases its 
market value. 
 
Despite the empirical evidence for the synergy created through risk diversification, 
finance theory has shown that in perfectly competitive financial markets, 
diversification only decreases the total risk, not the systematic risk. Since asset 
pricing is affected only by systemic risk, firm values should not react to acquisitions. 
Levy and Sarnat (1970) propose that market imperfections such as indivisibility of 
assets and existence of frictional costs (transaction costs, cost of information and 
monitoring, etc.) create room for further diversification and decrease the systemic 
risk, which in turn increases the market value if the acquiring firm. 
 
3.5. Characteristics of The Market for Corporate Control 
The environment the firms are operating influence their decision making process. 
For instance, the foundation of the Competition Authority (Rekabet Kurumu) in 
Turkey has increased the regulatory pressure upon mergers and acquisitions. Even 
though further research is needed to prove the effect on firm values, by comparing 
with the 1968 Williams Amendment in the USA, we may expect firm values to be 
negatively affected by stricter regulations. 
 
The number of bidders in an acquisition is also an important factor in determining 
the effect on the acquiring firm. As the number of bidders increases, the acquisition 
price rises, which is expected to affect the value of the acquiring firm negatively.  
 
The acquiring firm may finance the acquisition either through cash payment or stock 
issuance. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that cash financing is better for both the 
acquiring and the target firm. He posits that issuance of stock provides negative 
signals to the market, whereby decreases the firm value. 
                                                            
5 Williamson (1981) claims that even unrelated firms can benefit from acquisitions through 
economies of scope due to firms sharing of monitoring and administrative costs. 
The Effec
 
4. Meth
In order 
event stu
defined 
abnorma
 
where ܴ
normal r
 
Actual r
defined 
their diff
value. 
 
The esti
window 
included
 
Figure 1
calculate
acquisiti
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Esti
The mar
related t
using an
operation
expected
 
The retu
 
 
Where R
respectiv
instead o
the fluct
estimate 
              
6 See Sect
ts of Acquisiti
estim
wi
odology 
to measure th
dy approach
as the return
l return is: 
ప௧ and E(ܴప௧	|
eturns are line
eturn is the r
as the expect
erence provid
mation windo
is the interva
 in the event w
 illustrates t
d based on
on. The annou
mation of Th
ket model of 
o the return o
 overall mark
 of the acq
 returns.6  
rn of stock i a
୧୲ and R୫୲ ar
ely. α୧, β୧, ߪ஫ଶ
f an overall m
uations in ind
for abnormal
                      
ion 5 for furthe
-T... 
ons on Firm Va
ation 
ndow 
e effect of the
 by MacKin
 after the acq
ܣܴప௧ =
	ܺ௧)	are actua
arly related t
eturn of the 
ed return of t
es a good est
w is set to 
l ሾ߬ଵ, ߬ଶሿ. De
indow to cap
he timing of
the ܶ + ߬ଵ
ncement date
Figure 1. Tim
e Normal Re
security prici
f the market.
et index, I u
uiring firm. 
t time t is: 
R୧୲ = α
ܧ(ϵ୧୲) = 0
e return of st
೔ are the par
arket index, 
ustry is elim
 returns. The n
                      
r details. 
-τ1  
lue, Evidence 
event wind
 acquisition o
lay (1997). T
uisition. For
	 ܴప௧ − 	E(ܴ
l and normal
o market retu
stock after th
he stock if th
imate for the 
be T days p
note that −߬
ture the effec
 the estimat
observation
 is denoted b
eline of the
 
turns 
ng posits tha
 Different fro
se industry i
By this way
୧ + β୧R୫୲ +
ݒܽݎ(ϵ୧୲
ock i and the
ameters of t
ensures that t
inated. There
ormal return
  
                        0    
From Turkey 
ow 
n the acquirin
he abnormal
 firm i and 
ప௧	|	ܺ௧) 
 returns respe
rns, ܺ௧. 
e acquisition
ere was no a
effect of the 
rior to the a
ଵ days before
t of a possibl
ion process. 
s prior to t
y 0. 
 Acquisitions
t the return o
m the existin
ndices specifi
, I have a b
ϵ୧୲ ) = ߪ஫೔ଶ  
 return in the
he model. U
he part of the
fore, I will h
 is then, 
                      
g firm value,
 return on a
acquisition da
ctively. I ass
 and normal 
cquisition. T
acquisition on
cquisition. T
 the announc
e information
Expected ret
he announce
 
f a security is
g literature, i
c to the main
etter estimate
 industry of o
sing industry
 return associ
ave a lower v
83 
 I use the 
 stock is 
te t, the 
ume that 
return is 
herefore, 
 the firm 
he event 
ement is 
 leakage. 
urns are 
ment of 
 linearly 
nstead of 
 area of 
 for the 
(1) 
peration, 
 indices 
ated with 
arianced 
84 Fatma Büşra GÜNAY BENDAŞ 
 
E(ܴప௧	|	ܺ௧) = 	αෝ୧ 	+	ߚప෡R୫୲ 
 
where αෝ୧ and ߚప෡  are OLS estimates of parameters α୧ and β୧. 
 
4.2. Estimation of The Abnormal Return 
Now, we are ready to calculate abnormal returns of stock i at time t: 
 
ܣܴప௧ = 	ܴప௧ − 	E(ܴప௧	|	ܺ௧) 
 
Denote that the abnormal returns are actually the error terms in equation (1).  
 
Abnormal returns are normally distributed with mean 0 and variance ߪ஺ோ೔೟ଶ  where 
 
ߪ஺ோ೔೟ଶ = 	ߪ஫೔ଶ + ൬
1
τଵ + τଶ൰ ൬1 +
ܴ௠௧ − ̂ߤ୫
ߪො୫ଶ ൰ 
 
With ߪො୫ଶ  as the estimate of the variance in equation (1) and ̂ߤ୫	as the mean return of 
the industry during the event period. 
 
In order to have a better estimate for the effect of the acquisition, I find the 
cumulative abnormal return over the event period, which is the sum of individual 
abnormal returns. The cumulative abnormal return of stock i is: 
 
ܥܣܴ௜ = 	 ෍ ܣܴ௜௧
ఛమ
௧ୀఛభ
 
 
Under the null hypothesis H0 that the acquisition has no effect on the value of the 
firm, the distribution of the abnormal returns is given by; 
 
ܣܴ௜௧ ∼ ܰ(0	, ߪ஺ோ೔೟ଶ )		 
 
Using individual variances of the abnormal return, the variance of the cumulative 
abnormal return is; 
 
ݒܽݎ(ܥܣܴ௜) = 	ߪଶ = 	෍ ߪ஺ோ೔೟ଶ
ఛమ
௧ୀఛభ
+ 2 ෍ ܿ݋ݒ(ܣܴ௜௧, ܣܴ௜௧ᇱ)
ఛభஸ௧ழ௧ᇱஸఛమ
 (2) 
 
Therefore, the cumulative abnormal return of stock i is distributed normally; 
 
ܥܣܴ௜ ∼ ܰ(0	, ߪଶ	)	 
 
Now, we are ready to provide a t-statistic with n-1 degrees of freedom to test our 
null hypothesis, H0. 
 
ݐ(௡ିଵ) =
ܥܣܴ௜
√݊ߪ௜
 
Denote that the sample size n is simply equal to −߬ଵ + ߬ଶ. 
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5. Data and Results 
Data on M&A activities from Borsa Istanbul Daily Bulletins is used to identify 336 
acquisitions that took place in Turkey in 2013. Out of 336, the ones with domestic 
acquirers whose shares are traded on Borsa Istanbul and  who are involved only in 1 
M&A activity are considered. Table (1) summarizes the resulting 22 acquisitions. 
 
Table 1. Domestic Acquisitions in Turkey, 2013 
ACQUIRER 
CODE ACQUIRER  TARGET 
DOHOL Doğan Şirketler Grubu Holding A.Ş. Doğan TV Holding 
KRSAN Karsusan Karadeniz Su Ürünleri Sanayii A.Ş.  Etiler İnci Büfe 
SNGYO Sinpaş Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş.  Paşalimanı Un Fabrikası 
ULAS Ulaşlar Turizm Yatırımlari ve Dayanıklı Tüketim Malları Ticaret Pazarlama A.Ş Polat Alara Hotel 
EGCYH Egeli-Co Girişim Sermayesi Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş.  Enda Enerji 
KILER Kiler Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş.  Aras EDAS 
AKSEN Aksa Enerji Üretim A.Ş.  Gesa Güç Sistemleri 
DENIZ Denizbank A.Ş.  Citi Türkiye-Bireysel Bankacılık Bölümü 
SAHOL Hacı Ömer Sabancı Holding A.Ş. CarrefourSA 
ANELE Anel Elektrik Proje Taahhüt ve Ticaret A.Ş.  Anel Mekanik 
RHEAG Rhea Girişim Sermayesi Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. Netsafe Bilgi Teknolojileri Güvenliği 
EGCYO Egeli-Co Tarım Girişim Sermayesi Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş.  Doğa Tarım ve Hayvancılık 
DYOBY Dyo Boya Fabrikaları Sanayii ve Ticaret A.Ş.  Casati Türkiye 
ARENA Arena Bilgisayar ADEO Bilişim 
ODAS Odaş Elektrik Üretim Sanayi Ticaret A Ş Can Kömür 
BIMAS BIM Birleşik Mağazalar A.Ş.  Ziylan Mağazacılık, Polaris Pazarlama, Uğur İç ve Dış Ticaret 
KOMHL Kombassan Holding A.Ş.  Double Tree by Hilton Ankara 
NETAS Netaş Telekomünikasyon A.Ş.  Kron Telekomünikasyon 
AKFEN Akfen Holding  Adana İpekyolu Enerji Üretim 
KCHOL Koç Holding A.Ş.  Enerji Yatırımlari A.Ş. 
PEGYO Pera Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş.  Beken Otomotiv (Auto King) 
TATGD Tat Gıda Sanayi A.Ş. Tedi İçecek 
 
The estimation window is set to be 190 days7 before the acquisition date, omitting 
the last 4 days to exclude the effect of information leakage. The total number of 
observations for each firm in the event window is therefore 380 (1 for each trading 
session).  
 
Using session returns in the estimation window, I calculate the parameters of the 
market model. The results are summarized in Table (2). Session Returns are 
regressed against the relevant industry returns.8 As expected, session returns are 
positively related to industry returns. 
 
                                                            
7 The estimation window is smaller for KRSAN, ULAS, ODAS, TATGD since the shares of 
these firms were not traded during some portion of the 190-day estimation window. 
 
8 Returns on industry indices. 
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Table 2. Estimation Window Regression Results 
  ࢻෝ ࢼ෡෡ ࣌ෝ૛ CAR(10) Event Window (n) 
Mean Return 
(market) 
Variance 
(market) 
DOHOL -0.011 0.931 3.301 6.559 20 0.604 5.469 
KRSAN -0.716 0.359 51.532 6.796 20 0.308 0.382 
SNGYO -0.071 1.097 1.135 3.367 20 0.308 0.382 
ULAS -0.152 1.025 15.106 -1.248 20 -0.139 0.394 
EGCYH -0.059 0.473 1.882 1.257 20 0.002 0.579 
KILER -0.101 0.618 0.576 -0.974 20 0.002 0.579 
AKSEN 0.057 0.383 0.723 1.691 20 0.042 0.413 
DENIZ -0.051 0.519 2.629 1.438 20 0.078 1.101 
SAHOL 0.025 0.642 1.218 0.499 20 0.078 1.101 
ANELE -0.107 0.439 0.900 1.529 20 -0.209 4.417 
RHEAG -0.182 0.505 1.759 -0.053 20 -0.209 4.417 
EGCYO -0.07 0.501 2.836 0.228 20 0.307 3.267 
DYOBY 0.02 0.614 2.318 19.907 19 -0.190 18.913 
ARENA -0.02 0.42 1.291 0.864 20 0.884 7.196 
ODAS -0.103 0.461 3.584 6.064 20 0.884 7.196 
BIMAS -0.133 0.632 7.707 14.020 20 -0.020 1.108 
KOMHL -0.242 0.481 10.265 2.302 20 -0.020 1.108 
NETAS -0.076 0.812 1.824 -1.554 20 -0.020 1.108 
AKFEN -0.162 0.749 7.427 9.430 20 -0.257 1.845 
KCHOL 0.018 0.979 0.962 2.013 20 -0.257 1.845 
PEGYO -0.027 0.712 3.039 -5.935 20 -0.257 1.845 
TATGD 0.158 0.596 1.486 -2.684 20 -0.236 2.473 
 
At first, the event period considered is 10 days and 5 days, and then, it is set to 
include all data available after the date of acquisition. By setting different event 
windows, I try to explain the effect of the time frame after the acquisition, on the 
firm value. It may take up to 2 years to fully see the synergy created by the M&A. 
Therefore, using a short time frame may not give accurate information about the 
effect of the acquisition.  
 
The cumulative abnormal returns for the 10-day event period are given in Table (2). 
These returns include the abnormal returns for 10 days around the date of 
acquisition.9 Using CAR values and calculating its variance via equation (2), I 
conduct a one-tail t test to check null hypothesis that the abnormal returns are zero. 
For the 10-day and 5 day event windows, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The 
results are summarized in Table (3) and Table (4). 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
9 4 days before the event, event date and 5 days after the event, totaling 10 days. 
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Table 3.  10-Day Event Window t-Test Results 
  
Test Value = 0 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
DOHOL 0.622 19 0.541 0.32793 -0.7748 1.4307 
KRSAN 0.930 19 0.364 0.33980 -0.4247 1.1043 
SNGYO 0.825 19 0.419 0.16836 -0.2586 0.5954 
ULAS -0.576 19 0.571 -0.13368 -0.6193 0.3520 
EGCYH 0.276 19 0.785 0.06283 -0.4131 0.5388 
KILER -0.428 19 0.674 -0.04871 -0.2870 0.1896 
AKSEN 0.518 19 0.610 0.08455 -0.2569 0.4260 
DENIZ 0.147 19 0.885 0.09062 -1.2036 1.3849 
SAHOL 0.213 19 0.833 0.04811 -0.4240 0.5202 
ANELE 0.169 19 0.868 0.04869 -0.5560 0.6534 
RHEAG -0.134 19 0.895 -0.03457 -0.5741 0.5049 
EGCYO 0.080 19 0.937 0.02160 -0.5468 0.5900 
DYOBY 1.364 19 0.189 1.34660 -0.7197 3.4129 
ARENA 0.600 19 0.556 0.09782 -0.2434 0.4390 
ODAS 0.791 19 0.439 0.36314 -0.5977 1.3240 
BIMAS 2.029 19 0.057 0.70100 -0.0222 1.4242 
KOMHL 0.479 19 0.637 0.11511 -0.3879 0.6182 
NETAS -0.431 19 0.671 -0.07768 -0.4549 0.2995 
AKFEN 1.700 19 0.105 0.47151 -0.1088 1.0519 
KCHOL 0.550 19 0.589 0.10064 -0.2825 0.4838 
PEGYO -0.804 19 0.431 -0.29675 -1.0694 0.4759 
TATGD -0.557 19 0.584 -0.12151 -0.5779 0.3349 
 
Table 4.  5-Day Event Window t-Test Results 
  
Test Value = 0 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
DOHOL 0.750 9 0.472 0.74260 -1.4972 2.9824 
KRSAN 0.619 9 0.551 0.13649 -0.3624 0.6354 
SNGYO 0.183 9 0.859 0.04501 -0.5122 0.6022 
ULAS -0.291 9 0.778 -0.09282 -0.8150 0.6294 
EGCYH 0.887 9 0.398 0.21208 -0.3291 0.7532 
KILER 0.206 9 0.841 0.02180 -0.2176 0.2612 
AKSEN -1.802 9 0.105 -0.14893 -0.3359 0.0380 
DENIZ 0.114 9 0.912 0.14074 -2.6643 2.9458 
SAHOL 1.026 9 0.332 0.34299 -0.4135 1.0995 
ANELE 0.281 9 0.785 0.10193 -0.7199 0.9238 
RHEAG -0.274 9 0.790 -0.08422 -0.7789 0.6105 
EGCYO 0.945 9 0.370 0.35853 -0.5001 1.2172 
DYOBY -0.040 9 0.969 -0.01336 -0.7596 0.7329 
ARENA 0.126 9 0.903 0.02688 -0.4573 0.5111 
ODAS -0.540 9 0.602 -0.18370 -0.9533 0.5859 
BIMAS 1.353 9 0.209 0.80554 -0.5409 2.1519 
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Table 4. Continues 
KOMHL 0.308 9 0.765 0.09000 -0.5705 0.7505 
NETAS 0.039 9 0.970 0.01205 -0.6828 0.7069 
AKFEN -0.653 9 0.530 -0.17119 -0.7640 0.4216 
KCHOL 1.053 9 0.320 0.25669 -0.2947 0.8081 
PEGYO -1.385 9 0.200 -0.67227 -1.7706 0.4260 
TATGD -0.697 9 0.503 -0.17832 -0.7568 0.4002 
 
According to the long run event window results in Table (5), 9 out of 22 acquisitions 
have created value for the acquirer firm in the long run.10 There is no significant 
pattern in the type of these acquisitions. Both vertical and horizontal acquisitions 
have resulted an increase in firm value. This result is controversial to Akben-Selcuk 
and Altiok-Yilmaz (2011).  The difference in the expected returns due to the use of 
industry indices instead of the market index as well as the difference in the event 
windows may be the reason for the results to differ from theirs. 
 
Table 5. Long-run t-Test Results 
  
Test Value = 0 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
DOHOL -0.252 1052 0.801 -0.01276 -0.1120 0.0865 
KRSAN* 10.628 1052 0.000 0.73608 0.6002 0.8720 
SNGYO 0.613 1052 0.540 0.02473 -0.0545 0.1039 
ULAS 1.416 1008 0.157 0.08442 -0.0326 0.2014 
EGCYH 0.706 968 0.480 0.04121 -0.0733 0.1557 
KILER 1.255 968 0.210 0.06778 -0.0382 0.1738 
AKSEN -1.843 922 0.066 -0.08919 -0.1842 0.0058 
DENIZ 0.370 922 0.711 0.01570 -0.0675 0.0989 
SAHOL -0.829 922 0.407 -0.02687 -0.0905 0.0367 
ANELE* 2.043 840 0.041 0.09870 0.0039 0.1935 
RHEAG* 2.335 840 0.020 0.17570 0.0280 0.3234 
EGCYO* 2.850 796 0.004 0.19391 0.0604 0.3275 
DYOBY 1.082 759 0.280 0.05978 -0.0487 0.1683 
ARENA 1.889 715 0.059 0.10505 -0.0041 0.2142 
ODAS* 3.535 715 0.000 0.24137 0.1073 0.3754 
BIMAS* 3.774 641 0.000 0.15006 0.0720 0.2281 
KOMHL* 3.394 641 0.001 0.20256 0.0854 0.3197 
NETAS* 1.971 641 0.049 0.12424 0.0004 0.2480 
AKFEN* 3.959 597 0.000 0.18399 0.0927 0.2753 
KCHOL 0.001 597 0.999 0.00002 -0.0684 0.0685 
PEGYO 0.111 597 0.912 0.00979 -0.1632 0.1828 
TATGD -2.166 597 0.031 -0.10047 -0.1916 0.0094 
 
The long run event window estimation results are consistent with the theoretical 
view that it takes time to observe the synergy created in acquisitions. But, empirical 
research conflicts with these findings. Malmendier, Moretti and Peters (2012) show 
                                                            
10 The increase in value of KRSAN, ANELE, RHEAG, EGCYO, ODAS, BIMAS, KOMHL, 
NETAS, AKFEN shares is statistically significant. 
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that the in a 3-year period after the acquisition, the winning bidder firm 
underperforms compared to other bidders. The answer to this contradictory result 
comes from Rau and Vermaelen (1998). They demonstrate that the market and the 
management over-extrapolate the bidder firms' past performance. Therefore, if the 
bidder's pre-acquisition price-to-book ratio is high (i.e, the firm is a glamour firm), 
the market overestimates the value of the acquisition, which may cause higher 
abnormal returns in the short run compared to the abnormal returns of value firms11. 
But in the long run, when the market corrects its belief, the value firms will have 
higher (positive) abnormal returns than the glamour firms. 
 
In order to check this proposition, I compare the average P/B ratio of the 9 firms 
whose abnormal returns are significantly greater than 0, with the P/B ratio of the 
remaining firms. The t-test results are shown on Table (6). The results support 
Malmendier, Moretti and Peters (2012). The firms with positive abnormal returns 
have lower P/B ratios. In other words, value firms have higher abnormal returns 
compared to others.  
 
Table 6. Equality of P/B ratios, t-Test Results. 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Diff. Std. Error Diff. 
%80 Confidence Interval 
of the Diff. 
          Lower Upper 
-1.473 18.752 0.157 -0.29857 0.20273 -0.56787 -0.02927 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper opposes the paradox that the acquirer firm loses value after the 
acquisition by extending the measurement period to cover the lag in synergy 
creation. Synergy created through economies of scale and economies of scope may 
take substantial amount of time. Therefore, in measuring the value creation, it is 
beneficial to consider longer time frames. I use the market model along with stock 
data from Borsa Istanbul to estimate the value creation in acquisitions in Turkey, in 
2013. 
 
The estimation results indicate no statistically significant value creation in the short 
run, but in the long run, 9 out of 22 acquisitions increased the value of the acquirer 
firm. In order to explain the difference in the long run results, I test the proposition 
that the market and the management over-extrapolate the bidder firms' past 
performance. In order to check this proposition, I compare the average P/B ratio of 
the 9 firms whose abnormal returns are significantly greater than 0, with the P/B 
ratio of the remaining firms. The results support Malmendier, Moretti and Peters 
(2012). The firms with positive abnormal returns have lower P/B ratios. In other 
words, value firms have higher abnormal returns compared to others.  
 
The key limitation of this study along with all market model studies, is the 
complexity of the external factors affecting firm value. Even though this paper 
excludes effects of additional mergers and acquisitions, it is not possible to track 
down all other external factors and isolate the effect of the acquisitions. In this 
perspective, a sector analysis may be performed in future research to isolate the 
sectorial effects.  
                                                            
11 Firms whose P/B ratio is low. 
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Also, in this paper, acquisitions are not differentiated in terms of payment method. 
Grouping the acquisitions in terms of payment method may be useful in tracking 
down the effect of cash and stock financing on the value creations in acquisitions. 
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